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This paper examines the extent to which the valuation of partial interests in private 
property vehicles should be closely aligned to the valuation of the underlying assets.    
A sample of vehicle managers and investors replied to a questionnaire on the 
qualities of private property vehicles relative to direct property investment. Applying 
the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) technique the relative importance of the 
various advantages and disadvantages of investment in private property vehicles 
relative to acquisition of the underlying assets are assessed.  The results suggest 
that the main drivers of the growth of the this sector have been the ability for certain 
categories of investor to acquire interests in assets that are normally inaccessible 
due to the amount of specific risk.  Additionally, investors have been attracted by the 
ability to ‘outsource’ asset management in a manner that minimises perceived 
agency problems.  It is concluded that deviations from NAV should be expected 
given that investment in private property vehicles differs from investment in the 
underlying assets in terms of liquidity, management structures, lot size, financial 
structure inter alia.  However, reliably appraising the pricing implications of these 
variations is likely to be extremely difficult due to the lack of secondary market trading 
and vehicle heterogeneity.  




The growth of private indirect property vehicles has been one of most dramatic 
changes in the property investment market over the last decade.  Most notably, there 
has been a major increase in the use of Limited Partnership structures.  However, 
the product universe is diverse, with all structures having at their core the ‘wrapping’ 
of the property assets into a multi-investor vehicle. Whilst, the appraisal of the 
underlying assets is typically carried out by the ‘normal’ property valuation sector, a 
new breed of property professional has emerged to deal with investment in (and the 
valuation of) interests in private property vehicles. This sector of the market has 
developed rapidly and, consequently, market participants are seeking more 
sophisticated methods to price products as well as finding explanations for the pricing 
observed in the market place.  
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which the valuation of interests in 
private property vehicles should be closely aligned to the valuation of the underlying 
assets.  The valuation of fractional or partial interests has generated a range of 
research ranging from shared ownership of a single asset to the problems of property 
company valuation. Given that investment in private vehicles provides a range of 
additional advantages and disadvantages relative to direct ownership, we expect that 
there should be some deviation from a simple asset driven approach.  In this paper 
we build on Newell and Fife (2002) and apply an Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
technique to assess the relative importance of the various advantages and 
disadvantages of investment in private vehicles.  
 
Forms of indirect property investment 
 
One, often overlooked feature, of the indirect property market is the sheer diversity of 
vehicles. Indirect property investment in the UK is generally undertaken through 
employing one of three legal formats: partnerships, unit trusts or companies.  Broadly 
speaking, these formats can be seen as lying on a continuum in terms of size, trading 
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Figure 1   
 
 
Figure 1 shows that the vehicles can range from joint ventures - vehicles with two or 
three investors pooling money and know-how for a certain time span (implying 
virtually no trades) and a clearly defined (typically small) asset base - towards 
property companies listed on the stock exchange with a high number of investors and 
a large portfolio of assets (in value and number). While joint ventures are normally 
tailored towards the particular investor needs, property companies are governed by 
regulations to decrease investor risk, which leave little room to accommodate 
individual investor needs.  
 
In the following section, the Limited Partnerships, Property Unit Trusts and property 
company structures as well as their degree of utilisation in the UK market are 
discussed. Furthermore, recent changes in the investment environment and their 
implications for the indirect market will be identified. 
 
Private Property Vehicles 
 
Limited Partnerships have been one of the most commonly employed vehicle 
structures to pool property investment. Based on the Limited Partnership Act 1907 
these structures need a minimum of two partners; a general partner, in charge of 
management and fully liable for the partnerships assets/debts, and a limited partner, 
whose liability is by contrast limited to his share of capital invested. This limited 
liability status is conditional on the non-involvement of the limited partner in 
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Another typical structure used for pooled investment in a portfolio of assets is unit 
trusts, with Property Unit Trusts (PUTs) investing in the property sector. PUTs are 
based on trust law which means investors typically elect a supervisory board, acting 
in a representative function for the investors in appointing and supervising the trustee 
and the investment manager. The trustee is responsible for the operation of the trust 
while the investment manager deals with the investment decisions and issuance and 
redemption of fund units. 
 
In order for a PUT to be advertised and sold to retail investors the PUT needs to be 
authorized according to the Trustee Investment Act 1961; all other funds are 
therefore unauthorised. The authorisation by the FSA implies certain restrictions on 
portfolio choice, redemption and cash-holding, which have been lightened 
considerably by the new collective investment scheme sourcebook, COLL, which 
came into force in 2004 (Lizieri & Ward, 2004). 
 
UK based unauthorised PUTs tend to be exempt structures implying that they are 
only open to tax exempt UK investors, which makes them tax transparent like LPs.  
These PUTs are often employed by small and medium sized institutional investors to 
gain exposure to quasi-diversified portfolios of commercial property assets. The 
issuance and redemption of PUTs units close to net asset value (NAV) and limited 
trading in the secondary market make the risk-return profile of PUTs close to 
reported appraisal based market performance indices. In addition to the UK based or 
onshore PUTs institutional investors are currently seeking exposure to offshore PUTs 
in tax havens like Jersey and Guernsey.  
 
One of the longest running forms of indirect property investment vehicle is a listed 
property company. However, listed property companies have not participated on the 
upwards trend in indirect property investment during the last decade. Three reasons 
are responsible for this development. Listed companies are not tax transparent, 
implying that they are taxed twice first on the company level then on the investor 
level. In comparison to direct or other indirect formats they are therefore tax 
inefficient structures. Secondly listed property companies show a closer correlation to 
the equities market than to the property markets making them less attractive for 
institutional investors seeking a different way to gain property exposure. The 
strongest driver, however, seems to be the discount to NAV most property 
                                                 
3 The strong growth of fractional interest is not only common in the UK but for example also in the US 
and Australia see Hess and Liang (2004) and Newell/ Keng/ Fife (2005).   - 4 -
companies are traded at (Kutsch & Lizieri, 2005). Barkham & Ward (1999) showed 
that the discount has widened sharply during the late 1990’s, which led to several 
companies being taken private and therefore decreasing market capitalisation. They 
estimated that the long-run discount is 25% of NAV.   
 
Figure 2 shows the development of UK private indirect market over the last 15 years. 
The majority of the gross asset value (GAV) is invested in PUTs onshore and 
offshore as well as LPs, but does include less popular structures like managed funds 
and private companies.   
 

















































Source: OPC, March 2005 
 
Looking at Figure 2 it is obvious that the private indirect market experienced 
exponential-type growth since 1999/2000
3. This growth has been mostly driven by 
Limited Partnerships, which have been the vehicle of choice for a number of years. 
Illustrative of the sector’s propensity to sudden shifts in vehicle structures are the 
implications of two recent events that triggered dramatic changes of the market 
structure.  
 
Firstly, the introduction of Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) increased transaction costs 
of secondary trading dramatically. The changes in property transaction taxation 
introduced a 4% tax liability on the gross asset value of the partnership for the 
transfer of limited partnerships interest. Due to the fact that many LPs have loan-to-  - 5 -
value ratios of about 60% this implies transaction costs of about 10% for the equity 
interest.  The second change in the investment environment reducing the popularity 
of limited partnerships has been the introduction of the Jersey expert fund regime by 
the Jersey Financial Service Commission (JFSC). The expert fund regime eases the 
establishment of new funds that meet the conditions of exceeding an asset value 
£52,000 and have a minimum of two board members who are Jersey residents. Both 
events occurring in close proximity have started a wave of LPs being moved offshore 
into Jersey Property Unit Trusts (JPUTs), which are not affected by the taxation 
changes. 
 
Even though the market has grown considerably, research concerning private 
property vehicles (PPVs) is limited. Oxford Property Consultants (2001) has in 
cooperation with the University of Reading undertaken research in this field seeking 
the views of investors, managers and advisors within the market.
4 Baum (2001) 
found that this structure is attractive to institutional investors due to their unregulated 
status and high level of flexibility to meet investor needs. In addition, tax 
transparency and the ability to gear (circumventing restrictions investors might be 
subject to in direct investment) seem to be positive characteristics of the structure.  
Other key advantages of PPVs cited were access to management expertise and 
access to projects that usually exceed the capital constraints of the investors. Further 
the alignment of interests with the manager
5, the transparency of information and the 
possibility to access gearing
6 were mentioned as being advantageous in comparison 
to direct investments. 
 
On the other hand a major concern raised by the participants was the lack of liquidity, 
which might cause particular difficulties in a market downturn. Connected with this 
issue is the lack of an established secondary market and the uncertainty about 
market prices. The valuation technique identified is a simple apportionment of the 
vehicles net asset value. A shortcoming of this survey is that it simply listed the main 
advantages and disadvantages of the private vehicle investment route and does not 
gauge the relative balance between or the relative importance of the reported costs 
and benefits. 
                                                 
4 The research report generally identifies the views of the three groups: advisors, investors and 
managers separately and then identifies market consensus. The review here given will focus on these 
consensus statements. Readers how are interested in the opinions of single groups should refer directly 
to the report.  
5 Which can be achieved through either co-investment or performance related remuneration.  
6 This is mainly the case for pension funds which are often restricted in the trustee treaty to use gearing 
in their direct property portfolio.   - 6 -
 
The doubts associated with the approach to valuation are not only a UK 
phenomenon. Fife and Newell (1995, 2002) showed that internationally approaches 
have been inadequate through insufficient detailed analysis and unreliable 
comparable information. The body of knowledge in fractional interests is limited and 
often anecdotal, with much of the evidence using property security data as 
comparables (Fife and Newell, 2002; Wiggins and Rosenberg, 2001).  Specific 
aspects considered in the valuation of fractional interests have included: 
 
•  directional control of asset (Healy, 1988) 
•  relative liquidity of fractional interests compared to whole (Hall, 1989) 
•  compatibility of co-owners (Donaldson, 1994; Stewart, 1997) 
•  transfer constraints of present co-ownership structure (Donaldson, 1994) 
•  discounting methodologies for lack of control and lack of marketability (Webb, 
2001; Wiggins and Rosenberg, 2001) 
•  risk factors (Thompson and Dagbjartsson, 1994; Webb 2001)   
•  impact of number of co-owners on discount (Humphrey and Humphrey, 
1997). 
 
This lack of established procedures to assess the value of fractional interests 
confirms the valuation issues as being inadequately understood (Fife and Newell, 
2002); hence reinforcing the risk from such fractional interest investments in Limited 
Partnerships.  
 
Many studies refer to comparables from the listed indirect market, like REITs or 
property companies, or samples of actual trading of limited partnership interests. As 
aforementioned the public and the private indirect market have shown differences in 
their development over the last decade. Whilst market participants report premiums 
to NAV in the private indirect market, property companies trade at a long-term 
discount to NAV of 25% as observed by Barkham & Ward (1999). They concluded in 
their research that many indicators show that the discount can be traced back to 
noise trader
7 in the market. Noise traders in the equities market are retail investors 
however collective investment limited partnerships are (normally) exclusive for 
institutional investors. A transfer of the results therefore seems to provide limited 
                                                 
7 Noise traders are irrational traders that create noise in the market and are a potential risk to rational 
traders. The rational investor will price this risk into their prices.   - 7 -
insights. Trying to find answers by actual trade data is problematic since there is no 
established secondary market or market-maker who could generate data. The lack of 
data is increased further by a generally low number of trades taking place with most 
being undertaken by means of a private treaty and under confidentiality.  
 
Newell and Fife (2002) carried out research in Australia aiming to maintain some 
inside in the drivers of valuations of fractional interests in Australian LPTs. They 
identified and prioritised 22 key factors, five factors with 17 sub-factors, by employing 
the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). 15 owners and 18 valuers responded.  They 
judged that the underlying asset quality had the highest importance with 34.5%, 
followed by control and the terms of the co-ownership agreement with approximately 
18% each and ownership structure and liquidity with approximately 14% of 
importance each in determining the value of a fractional interest. The relatively low 
ranking of liquidity and control came as a surprise considering their predominance in 
literature. A further investigation of the results split into owner and valuer groups 
showed no significant differences in the assessment of a fractional interest. The 
highest influence on the value had the sub-factor level were given to voting 
inequality, revenue inequality and ownership costs
8.  
 
In summary, the central issue is that by investing through private collective vehicles 
rather than through direct acquisition of the property assets themselves, investors are 
investing in assets with different investment qualities than ownership of the 
underlying assets.   Relative to direct ownership, there are significant differences in 
liquidity, trading and price formation, search costs, management control, lot size, 
taxation and transaction costs inter alia.  A priori, we expect these differences to 
have pricing implications.  It would be surprising if a simple pro-rata division of NAV 
accurately reflected their pricing implications - even if the NAV was reliably 




A replication of the research undertaken by Fife and Newell (2002) for the UK market 
was the original vantage point for this research.  However, important structural 
differences that exist between Australian LPTs and UK limited partnerships needed 
be accommodated while identifying the key factors for limited partnerships. 
                                                 
8 This ignores underlying asset quality for which no sub-factors where identified.   - 8 -
Nevertheless, the theoretical basis in shape of the AHP is kept. AHP has been used 
extensively in property research in identifying and prioritising factors in the areas of 
building quality, house selection, LPT fractional interests, environment planning and 
housing (Ball and Srinivasan, 1994; Bender et al, 1999, 2000; Fife and Newell, 2002; 
Ho, 1999; Ong and Chew, 1996). Partovi and Burton (1993) described the 
methodology as a simple three-step process: 
 
i.  Description of the decision problem in form of a hierarchy, through the 
identification of decision criteria and sub criteria. 
ii.  Calculation of the relative weights of the decision criteria on each level of the 
hierarchy using pair-wise comparison of the criteria. 
iii.  Development of a decision model through the integration of the relative 
importance of the criteria. 
 
The first step was, therefore, the identification of factors and sub-factors. Those are 
based on previous research as well as pilot interviews with experts in the industry.  A 
full list of the factors can be seen in Appendix 1. The factors are split into four 
categories: 
 
−  Benefits associated with investing in private vehicles (access to specialist 
management, tax efficiency, ability to gear, access to assets),  
 
−  Benefits associated with the LP structure itself (limited liability, fixed life span, 
interest alignment, presence of co-investors),  
 
−  Costs associated with reduced liquidity (pre-emption rights, limited secondary 
market, effects of limited lifespan, market price uncertainty) 
 
−  Additional costs associated with LP structure (complexity of structure, fees, 
gearing risk, performance measurement uncertainty, potential conflict with co-
owners) 
 
A number of the variables hypothesised can be viewed in terms of being a 
disadvantage or advantage. For instance, the ability to gear could be an attraction of 
the vehicles for investors who have gearing restrictions. At the same time, many 
investors view the additional risk of gearing and the implications for the pattern of   - 9 -
investment performance in negative terms.  Similarly, the presence of co-investors 
provides a signal to investors that a vehicle is appropriate but produces a potential 
for conflict with co-investors about asset and vehicle activities. 
 
In a second step the relative importance of the factors needed to be assessed. 
Respondents were asked to make pair-wise comparisons of the factors and rate 
them on a scale of 1-5. The scale runs from 2 “slightly more important” increasing to 
5 “completely dominates”; 1 is indicating equal importance. 
 
The final step was the analysis of the questionnaires using the Expert Choice 11 
software, which calculates the relative importance as a percentage. By evaluating the 
factors and sub-factors a hierarchy of the sub-factors could be produced taking into 
consideration the relative importance of both levels. 
 
One initial explicit aim of the research is to investigate whether these vehicles should 
trade at discounts or premiums to their NAV.  Hence one initial aim of the research 
was to assess the extent to which the positive factors to direct ownership (producing 
a premium) would outweigh the negative factors (producing a discount).  It is 
anticipated that the advantages will be perceived to outweigh the disadvantages 
considering the rapid market growth of this sector.  As a result, the main contribution 
is expected to be an evaluation of the relative importance of the various advantages 
and disadvantages specified.    
 
In terms of limitations, our survey will only provide a single snapshot of investors’ 
perceptions.  For instance, liquidity (in terms of ability to exit at market price) will vary 
over time and between assets.  In the same way that the deviation from NAV varies 
over time for property companies and also varies between property companies, it is 
also to be expected that there will be similar patterns to deviation from NAV for 




A sample of investors was asked to undertake pair-wise comparisons and rate the 
relative importance of the characteristics for the second step of the AHP. The 18 
interviewees all had current or prior active involvement in the indirect property 
investment market for limited partnerships, which means that non-investors were 
excluded from the sample. Data provided by Oxford Property Consultants showed   - 10 -
that many investors seek external investment advice from professional advisors, 
which were therefore included in the sample. The majority of advisors are also 
actively managing their own vehicles and/or actively investing their own money into 
indirect structures.  Non-investors are difficult to identify and their exclusion from the 
sample suggests that it may be positively biased towards benefits of investment in 
private vehicles.  However the sector is still in its development phase and non-
investors might not necessarily have taken an active step to refuse investment in this 
sector.  The interviews in which the participants were asked to fill in a paper based 




The results of the comparison process are displayed in Table 1. As expected, a 
clear-cut finding is that respondents found that the investment benefits of limited 
partnerships significantly outweigh the costs associated with this approach to 
property investment.  Considering the exponential-type growth of the market, this 
result was anticipated.  It is unlikely that the market would have grown at the rate that 
it has if investors did not view the vehicles as offering significant advantages relative 
to direct investment.  It seems reasonable to argue that if these benefits are not 
incorporated into the estimation of the NAV of the vehicles, then we may observe 
premiums to NAV
9 when the assets are traded.       
 
More specifically, it is the fact that the vehicles offer investors the ability to access 
both particular assets and specialist management that seems to be the key 
attractions driving this growth.  For investors excluded from sectors such as shopping 
centres, retail warehouse parks and ‘trophy’ office developments due to problems of 
lot size and specific risk, private vehicles offer an attractive option. Ability to gear and 
tax efficiency remain important in the overall context but are dominated as 
investment benefits by the access to specific assets at the right lot size and specialist 
management. 
 
Clearly, the pricing effects of these variables will be contingent upon the perceived 
quality of the management and the nature of the underlying assets.  Given that 
                                                 
9 Our discussions with market participants indicated that the calculation of NAV was usually a 
mechanistic process based on the estimation of Gross Asset Value and deducting the estimated value of 
liabilities (debt, management and other fees).  There were few exceptions to this ‘rule’ despite the fact 
that most interests are currently trading at premiums to NAV.   - 11 -
management ability should affect expected future cash flows, it seems reasonable 
that investors will pay a premium to have their assets managed by high quality 
managers.  However, in the absence of market pricing signals, appraisers will have 
problems quantifying this factor.  Further, the ‘wrapping’ of the assets in vehicles 
creates a new price formation environment.  The main effect is that there is a larger 
pool of potential buyers.  A premium may be justified where investors are offered the 
benefits of access to previously ‘unavailable’ assets, an appropriate lot size (reduced 
specific risk), lower search costs and fast execution associated with Limited 
Partnerships.  The key benefit for investors in terms of the vehicle structure was the 
ability to align the interests of the manager and the investor.  This is typically 
facilitated by co-investment and performance-related fee structures.  However, again 
in the absence of pricing signals, valuers will face problems of attaching monetary 
values to these effects. 
 
A key reason for the lack of reliable pricing signals is the lack of liquidity/trading.  One 
source of major concern in the market still is the liquidity of a limited partnership 
investment. After investment benefits, liquidity costs were the second most important 
group of factors.  Within this group, lack of secondary market trading was the most 
important aspect of lack of liquidity.  Although participants often argued that the 
current market allows for fast execution of fractional interest sales, they questioned 
the marketability of such interests in a market downturn.  This implies that investors 
are aware that liquidity is closely linked to market conditions.  Revealingly, a central 
London residential fund was mentioned as being currently relatively illiquid and was 
being valued at a discount to NAV. As suggested earlier, liquidity (ability to exit at fair 
value) varies cross-sectionally between various interests and structures and will 
change at an aggregate level over time.     
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Table 1: Relative importance of valuation criterias 
 
Factor Weight  Subfactor  Weight 
Investment benefit  47.82%    
    Access to specific asset  30.08% 
  
Access to specialist 
management  29.71% 
   Tax  efficiency  22.09% 
   Ability  to  gear  18.14% 
Liquidity Costs  19.77%    
  
Limited secondary market 
trading 38.67% 
  
Liquidity effects of limited life 
span 22.24% 
    Market price uncertainty  21.39% 
   Pre-emption  rights  17.69% 
Positive aspects of LP 
structure  17.86%   
    Interest alignment with manager  38.76% 
   Limited  Liability  28.95% 
    Presence of co-investor  22.41% 
   Fixed  life  span  9.88% 
Other costs of LP structure  14.54%    
   Management  fees  34.52% 
   Risk  through  gearing  24.58% 
    Potential for conflict  19.23% 
   Performance  uncertainty  11.26% 
      Complexity of LP Structure  10.41% 
Total 100%    
   - 13 -
 
Compared to liquidity-related issues the other costs associated with the LP structure 
were regarded as less important.  In the interviews, management fees were often 
raised by market participants are a source of friction between managers and 
investors.  However, whilst they may be a justifiable source of concern to investors, 
such fees do not seem to raise problems for appraisers.  Although there is scope for 
variations in accounting interpretation, fee liabilities can be quantified and 
incorporated into the appraisal process.   
 
Interestingly, the ability of high gearing to change the performance patterns of the 
investment was regarded the next important problem of the vehicles.  The gearing 
point reflects some of the difficulties inherent in this research.  Discussions 
suggested that the attractiveness of various gearing levels varied with investor.  In 
essence there were significant clientele effects and it is extremely difficult to make a 
general judgement about whether the ability to gear is an advantage or 
disadvantage. Additionally, the perception of gearing is also linked to the amount of 
gearing.  
   
Table 2 sets out the overall hierarchy of factors.  These are simply calculated by 
multiplying the weight of the main category by the weight of the sub-factor within that 
category.  Clearly, given the strong dominance of ‘investment benefits’ the four sub-
factors in this category are at the top of the rankings.   The only disadvantages of the 
vehicles that have any prominence are the management fees and lack of secondary 
market trading.   - 14 -
 
Table 2: Hierarchy of sub factors 
Ranking Sub  factor  Weight 
1  Access to specific asset  14.52%
2  Access to specialist management  14.48%
3 Tax  efficiency  10.39%
4 Ability  to  gear  8.44%
5  Limited secondary market trading  6.26%
6  Interest alignment with manager  6.09%
7 Management  fees  5.55%
8 Limited  Liability  5.31%
9  Liquidity effects of limited life span  4.98%
10  Presence of co-investor  4.71%
11  Market price uncertainty  4.36%
12 Pre-emption  rights  4.17%
13  Risk through gearing  3.27%
14 Potential  for  conflict  2.56%
15  Fixed life span  1.75%
16  Complexity of LP Structure  1.59%
17 Performance  uncertainty  1.57%
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Conclusion 
 
The rapid growth of investment in private property vehicles has led to the emergence 
of a new breed of property professional who specialise in their creation, 
management, transfer and  appraisal.  Although the vehicles are diverse, they have 
in common the creation of partial interests in returns linked directly to the underlying 
property assets.  However, investment in the private property vehicles differs from 
investment in the underlying assets in terms of liquidity, management structures, lot 
size, financial structure inter alia.  This leads to the first important conclusion that 
deviations from NAV should be expected.  Additionally, just as importantly, there are 
significant differences in liquidity etc among the vehicles.  Therefore, there will also 
be significant variations in the extent of deviations from NAV among the vehicles.   
Both issues add complexity to the process of estimating the exchange price of partial 
interests in private property vehicles. 
 
The main contribution of this research is that it improves our understanding of the key 
drivers of the growth of this increasingly important sector of the property market.  The 
main drivers have been the ability for certain categories of investor to acquire 
interests in assets that are inaccessible due to the amount of specific risk.   
Additionally, investors have been attracted by the ability to ‘outsource’ asset 
management in a manner that minimises perceived agency problems.   Since the 
financial impacts of the variables discussed are contingent upon both the 
characteristics of the specific vehicle and prevailing market conditions, the research 
is probably of little practical use to the appraisers of interests in vehicles.  Reliably 
incorporating these time and asset-specific variables into appraisals is likely to 
require an active secondary market in similar interests to provide reliable market 
signals of their pricing effects.  
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Appendix 1 
Investment benefits of LP 
 
•  Access to specialist management – The vehicle is managed by specialist in the 
sector. 
 
•  Tax efficiency – Assuming an offshore vehicle is typical, Stamp Duty is avoided. 
 
•  Ability to gear – Investor is able to access geared property investment. 
 
•  Ability to access specific asset at appropriate lot size - Investor is able to 
purchase interest in large assets.  Direct acquisition would not normally be feasible 
due to the high level of specific risk.   
 
Positive aspects of LP structure 
 
•  Limited liability – The investor’s liability is limited to the amount s/he has paid in.  
 
•  Fixed life span – There is a definite exit point for the investor. 
 
•  Interest alignment with manager – There is alignment of interest through co-
investment by the manager of the vehicle and performance related fee structure. 
 




•  Pre-emption rights (if present) – Investor’s disposal options are limited. 
 
•  Limited secondary market - Limited active secondary trading in LP interests can 
increase the uncertainty in timing and amount of capital receipts. 
 
•  Liquidity effects of limited lifespan – As the vehicle approaches a potential wind-
up point, consequent uncertainty in future investment horizon limits marketability of 
interest. 
 
•  Market price uncertainty – Difficulties of valuation relative to direct investment can 
produce valuation uncertainty associated with LP interest and affect the sale process. 
 
 
Other costs of LP structure 
 
•  Complexity of LP structure – Investor faces additional costs due to complexity of 
scheme.  At purchase there are additional due diligence costs.  During the holding 
period, the investor must monitor and manage the vehicle. 
  
•  Higher management costs and performance related fees - Management costs 
and fees for a LP interest are higher relative to direct holding. 
 
•  Risk through gearing - Investor is exposed to additional financial risk due to 
gearing. 
 
•  Performance measurement uncertainty - Uncertainty of performance measurement 
in LP scheme due to additional valuation uncertainty. 
 
•  Potential conflict with co-owners- Possibly that there will be potential disagreement 
among co-owners about asset and vehicle activities 
 